Richer countries are generally democratic. But this could reflect reverse causation or omitted variables. Evidence that democratizations yield subsequent economic growth is quite weak. Political regimes may still influence economic development, but the effects appear difficult to identify from the within-country variation. A plausible reason for this difficulty is that "democracy" is too blunt a concept. Political regimes come in various forms and are reformed in different circumstances. This paper illustrates three specific instances where the details of democratic reform influence their economic effects.
We first we clarify our methodology. While political institutions are generally very persistent, they sometimes change suddenly and drastically -as in many democratizations or coups. Under appropriate identifying assumptions, such regime changes can be exploited by comparing average performance before and after the event. Our sample has annual observations for about 150 countries and includes about 120 regime changes over the period 1960-2000; in Section III, we backdate the panel to the mid-1800s, with twice as many regime changes. We classify a country as democratic if the polity2 variable in the Polity IV data set is strictly positive. We estimate a panel regression:
y i,t − y i,t−1 = βy i,t−1 + φD i,t + ρx i,t + α i + θ t + ǫ i,t ,
where y i,t denotes (log) per capita income in country i and year t, D i,t is a dummy variable equal to one under democracy, x i,t is a vector of control variables, α i and θ t are country and year fixed effects. Thus, we estimate the parameter φ by difference in differences, where countries changing regime are the "treated", and those that do not are the "controls".
Identification requires that the selection of countries into democracy be uncorrelated with the country-specific and time-varying growth shock, ǫ i,t .
This allows any correlation between regime selection and the country fixed effect, α i -e.g., that fast-growing countries more likely become democratic than slow-growing ones. However, absent any regime change, average growth in reform countries should (counterfactually) have been the same as in nonreform countries (conditional on x i,t ). A concrete case where we might confound economic and political reforms is the 1990s, when many formerly com-munist regimes introduced democracy as well as market economy. Therefore, we include in x i,t a binary indicator for years after 1989 in the former Soviet bloc. We also include indicators for years of wars (current and lagged), as they are correlated with regime changes and growth. Most specifications also include dummy variables for continental location (Africa, Asia and Latin America) and socialist legal origin interacted with year dummy variables. To reduce serial correlation and allow for convergence, lagged per-capita income is always included.
Circumstances surrounding regime changes differ widely across time and location, as do the political institutions adopted or abandoned. Thus, the effects of a crude democracy indicator are likely to differ across observations.
If we neglect this heterogeneity and estimate the average effect of democracy as in (1), ǫ i,t also includes the term (φ i,t − φ)D i,t , where φ i,t is the effect of democracy in country i and year t. Identification of φ now requires the heterogeneous reform effect to be uncorrelated with its occurrence. This assumption fails if countries self-select into democracy based on the growth effect of regime changes (e.g., D i,t = 1 more likely when φ i,t > φ). Below, we decompose the effects of political reforms according to observable features, one at a time. Studying the economic outcomes of specific types of reforms is relevant from a practical point of view, and as a test of specific hypothesis.
This also makes identification of φ more credible by reducing unobserved heterogeneity; the relative effect of specific reforms can be identified under weaker assumptions than those needed to identify their average effect φ.
I. Economic liberalization and democracy
This section draws on Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) . In Table 1 , we start by estimating the average effect of democracy on growth, φ in (1 Considering the joint effect of reforms lends additional credibility to the identifying assumption, but does not address heterogeneity in the sequence of reforms. Column 3 adds two dummy variables to the regression, which equal unity when democracy is enacted first or last, respectively, and equal zero when only one type of reform occurs. 2 Countries where economic liberalization preceded democracy include South Korea, Taiwan, Chile and Mexico. The opposite sequence took place in countries as Argentina, Brazil, the Philippines and Bangladesh.
Enacting only one reform still has a positive and significant effect on growth, similar to those in columns 1 and 2. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of "democracy after liberalization" is positive and significant: the boost to growth from the two reforms is about 3.5 percent. But "liberalization after democracy" is negative and significant, implying an overall effect which is barely positive and statistically insignificant. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) show that this finding is very robust. A plausible interpretation is that young democracies in closed economic environments are more likely bogged down in redistributive conflict and populist policies, while young democracies in open economies are forced to pay more attention to economic efficiency.
Moreover, opening the economy often goes hand in hand with securing the protection of property rights and enforcing the rule of law, which may be a prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy. Naturally, the usual caveats about identification apply. Naturally, the usual caveats about identification apply. But if the estimates do uncover a causal effect, reformers of closed autocracies ought to give priority to economic over political liberalization.
II. Forms of democracy
This section draws on Persson (2005) , who studies heterogeneity in the kind of democratic institutions adopted or abandoned. Political scientists stress distinctions between different electoral rules and different forms of government. In our own recent research, we have shown that these constitutional forms imply systematic differences in economic policies. Do they also imply different growth effects of becoming a democracy?
Column 1 of Table 2 decomposes the average growth effect of democracy by adding two binary variables, one for the form of government (presidential vs. parliamentary), one for the electoral rule (majoritarian vs. proportional).
Otherwise, the regression is identical to column 1 of Table 1 . We thus add to (1) the probability of regime change -in the form of a hazard rate -as estimated by Persson and Tabellini (2005) . The growth equation is consistent with the estimated hazard rate and the sample is now 1850-2000. 6 As country and year fixed effects are included, we estimate the effects of expected democracy entirely from the time variation in the hazard rate.
The first two columns of Table 3 report the estimated results within regimes, confining attention to observations under democracy only, or autocracy only. Under democracy, the probability of regime change hurts growth, consistent with the finding that democracy raises growth. The large negative estimated coefficient reflects the dimension of the estimated hazard rate, which is typically below 10%, with an average of 3. A fall in the hazard by 2 percentage points thus raises growth by about 0.5 percentage points.
Similar effects are obtained by replacing growth with investment over the 1960-2000 sample. Under autocracy, the probability of regime change ought to spur growth. Instead, the coefficient is negative and insignificant. One interpretation is that we have omitted further heterogeneity, such that democratic reforms fail to boost economic performance in some autocracies.
Alternatively, political uncertainty exerts an offsetting negative effect.
In column 3, we study actual as well as expected political regimes in the full sample, including the democracy dummy plus the probability of autocracy in the current period (also interacted with lagged democracy, allowing the effect of expectations to differ by regime). 7 In addition to the exclusion restriction for democratic capital, identification relies on the usual identifying assumption -ǫ i,t uncorrelated with D i,t -now made more credible by including the probability of autocracy as a regressor. This specification is demanding, as actual democracy and the probability of autocracy are highly collinear. Nevertheless, the results support the idea that expected as well as actual regime changes play a role. Actual democracy now induces a growth acceleration of over 1 percent. The estimated convergence rate (2.8 percent) implies a long-run income rise of 35 percent. This growth effect is larger than the benchmark estimate in Table 1 . More importantly, it is also much larger than in the same specification over 150 years of data, where expectations are neglected (see Persson and Tabellini, 2005 Table 1 use this classification, which differs slightly from that in the preceding columns for a few countries.
3 Table 2 assumes the effect of the form of government and the electoral system to be additive. The results are robust to relaxing this assumption. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Specification identical to that in Table 1 , except that lagged income is excluded in cols 2 and 3. Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . Control variables: country and year fixed effects, lagged income, dummy variable for wars and lagged wars, dummy variable for former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe plus former Soviet Union after 1990. Transition years excluded.
